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On the occasion of its twenty-fifth birthday in 1987, the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, part of the Executive Office of the President, was described
in the media as "an obscure, elite agency."' 1 During the Bush administration,
environmental interest groups nonetheless found their way to its obscure, elite
offices in the Winder Building across from the Old Executive Office Building-
and are unlikely ever to leave.
This article offers a snapshot of milestones in a perceived collision between
U.S. public policies in promoting trade and protecting the environment. It first
focuses on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations,
the congressional debate in 1991 concerning whether to grant President Bush's
request for a two-year extension of fast-track procedures, and the Tuna/Dolphin
dispute settlement case in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Second, it outlines likely developments in the congressional debate this year on
a bill to implement the NAFTA and implications for the handling of trade-
environmental issues in the future. Third, the article assesses the trade-
environment conflicts as part of an overall increase, within an increasingly global
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economy, in international rulemaking concerning issues previously considered
purely domestic.
I. The NAFTA, Fast Track, and the Tuna/Dolphin GATT Cases
Public policies on trade promotion and environmental protection occasionally
collided with each other prior to 1991, to be sure. For example, over the adminis-
tration's objection, the Congress included differential taxes on United States and
foreign petroleum and petrochemical production in the 1986 Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act.2 The object of the legislation was to fund the
Superfund cleanup program, a high priority on the nation's environmental agenda.
By objecting to the bill's imposition of a higher tax on imported petroleum than
domestic petroleum, the administration sought to comply with the obligations of
the United States under the GATT.3 Article III of the GATT generally prohibits,
with respect to taxation, treating products of the GATT signatories less favorably
than domestically-made products. The administration believed that imposing an
11.7 cents per barrel fee on imported oil, versus only an 8.2 cents per barrel fee
on domestic oil, would be challenged in the GATT, perhaps successfully.
Enactment of the Superfund bill provoked almost immediate protests by the
governments of Canada, the European Communities, and Mexico. When consul-
tations failed to achieve a mutually satisfactory result, those governments re-
quested the establishment of a panel under the dispute settlement procedures of
the GATT article XXIII:2. The panel ruled in the challengers' favor,4 and the
GATT Council adopted the panel report.5
The Superfund GATT dispute was a distinctly minor event in the environmental
community, however, compared to President Bush's proposal in the fall of 1990
of a North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico 6 -the first
free trade agreement to be negotiated with a developing country with dramatically
lower labor rates. The President notified the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means Committees of his intention to enter into these negotiations with Mexico 7
2. Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1760 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1987, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Superfund Excise Taxes, June 17, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 1596 (1988).
5. The United States eventually eliminated the offending tax differential, and thus came into
conformity with its GATT obligations. See Steel Trade Liberalization Program Implementation Act
§ 8, Pub. L. No. 101-221, 103 Stat. 1886, 1891 (1989).
6. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by the Presidents of Mexico
and the United States on Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement (June 11, 1990), reprinted in JUDITH
H. BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMER, GUIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT app. A-2
at 982 (Supp. 1991).
7. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter from the President to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways
and Means (Sept. 26, 1990), reprinted in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 6, app. A-4 at 988-89.
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and Canada;' the committees' inaction to disapprove the negotiations rendered
them eligible for fast-track congressional approval procedures. 9 Under the "fast
track," any bill submitted by the President to implement a trade agreement would
be considered on a fixed timetable and would not be subject to amendments.' 0
However, authority for the fast-track procedures would have expired on March
1, 1991,11 unless by that date the President either notified the Congress of his
intention to enter into a trade agreement or requested a two-year extension of
the fast-track procedures.' 2 Obviously, the NAFTA negotiations then were only
beginning. Therefore, to preserve the fast track, on March 1, 1991, the President
transmitted to the Congress his request for the two-year extension.
The initial response of many in the Congress was decidedly negative. Organized
labor and many environmental groups, at least initially, opposed any extension
of the fast track. Organized labor feared American jobs would be exported to
Mexico under a free trade agreement, since Mexican labor rates are dramatically
lower than United States rates.
Various environmental groups, on the other hand, were concerned that growth
in trade with Mexico could jeopardize the environment, both along the border and
in Mexico. More extreme groups based their opposition on the prospect of growth
alone. Moderate groups supported the economic and trade growth that the NAFTA
was intended to stimulate, provided that environmental objectives were not sacri-
ficed to developmental objectives. The moderates sought assurances that the
environment, as well as trade, would prosper under the NAFTA.
Ultimately, the environmental community and its supporters in the Congress
received such assurances. In the Action Plan for the NAFTA submitted to the
Congress on May 1, 1991, the President made commitments regarding the protec-
tion of the environment in any North American trade agreement negotiated by his
administration. ' 4 In particular, the President stressed that U.S. health, safety, and
environmental standards would not be compromised, and that the NAFTA would
8. Letter from President Bush to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means
(Feb. 5, 1991), reprinted in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 6, app. A-6 at 993.
9. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1102(c)(3)(C), Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107, 1127 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c)(3)(C)) [hereinafter 1988 Act].
10. Trade Act of 1974, § 151, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-04 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2191).
11. 1988 Act, supra note 9, § 1103(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(2).
12. Id.
13. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Letter from President Bush to Congress,
reprinted in BELLO & HOLMER, supra note 6, app. A-7 at 998. See also Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, President Bush Asks Congress to Extend Fast-Track Procedures (Mar. 1, 1991);
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE EXTENSION OF FAST-TRACK PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION
1103(B) OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, H.R. DOC. No. 51, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
14. The President's Action Plan responded to requests made by Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Lloyd Bentsen and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski for
more information about how the environment and workers would be protected under the NAFTA.
See COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., lST SESS., EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ON ISSUES
SPRING 1993
172 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
not result in the dilution of U.S. minimum standards in these areas. Moreover,
he agreed to address bilateral environmental issues separately, but concurrently,
with the NAFTA talks.
With these assurances, the tide turned in the congressional fast-track debate
and an overwhelming majority voted to defeat resolutions that would have disap-
proved the President's request for an extension.' 5 Also by an overwhelming
majority, the House of Representatives passed a resolution offered by House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt and Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Dan Rostenkowski, stressing the importance of the administration's commitments
to protect the environment and workers as well as to promote trade in negotiating
an agreement with Mexico. 16
II. The Tuna/Dolphin Developments
If the debate on the extension of fast-track procedures framed the environmental
concerns posed by trade agreements in general and the NAFTA in particular, the
Tuna/Dolphin GATT case magnified them.
Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the U.S. embargoes imports of
tuna from any nation whose fishing fleets are found to use purse seine nets, which
catch an unduly large number of porpoises when used to fish for tuna.' 7 This
embargo is applied without regard to where the tuna (and, inadvertently, the
porpoises) are caught, even if they are caught in international or foreign waters
by foreign nationals on foreign flag vessels.
In 1990, the United States determined that tuna fishing fleets of Mexico and
several other countries were using the porpoise-unfriendly fishing methods; under
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, therefore, imports of tuna from these coun-
tries were blocked.'" Moreover, the United States threatened secondary boycotts
against other countries that failed to embargo imports of tuna from the offending
countries.
Mexico challenged the U.S. action in the GATT, article XI of which generally
prohibits the imposition of quantitive restrictions."' While article XI provides
some exceptions to the rule, the dispute settlement panel convened under article
XXIII:2 found that none of the exceptions applied in the case of the U.S. embargo
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Comm. Print
1991). This compilation contains the March 7, 1991, letter to the President from Chairmen Bentsen
and Rostenkowski (app. at 87), as well as the President's response.
15. The House vote on the resolution to disapprove the President's request was 192-231. 137
CONG. REC. H3588 (daily ed. May 23, 1991). The Senate vote on its identical disapproval resolution
was 36-59. 137 CONG. REC. S6829 (daily ed. May 24, 1991).
16. 137 CONG. REC. H3610-11 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (recording the vote of 329-85 in favor
of the Gephardt-Rostenkowski resolution).
17. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, § 101(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027,
1030 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
18. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
19. GATT, supra note 3, art. XI.
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of imports of yellowfin tuna. Accordingly, the panel ruled in Mexico's favor.2°
Because the United States and Mexico achieved a mutually satisfactory bilateral
resolution, the GATT Council never adopted the panel report.2
The U.S. environmental community considered the Tuna/Dolphin outcome a
nightmare come true. Not only did new NAFTA negotiations jeopardize the
environment; even existing trade rules in the GATT impeded the environmental
community's ability to use the clout of the U.S. market to protect the environment.
TheTuna/Dolphin outcome unleashed a spate of full-page newspaper advertise-
ments featuring leaping dolphins. The Government of Mexico's advertisement
stressed its continued committment to the adequate protection of environmental
resources. 22 Several environmental groups, on the other hand, stressed the be-
trayal of U.S. environmental objectives by "faceless GATT bureaucrats" whose
"secret" trade negotiations constitute a "sneak attack on democracy.' 23 While
the particular issues involved in the Tuna/Dolphin case are expected to be resolved
outside the GATT, 24 the case emblematizes the concern of many in the environ-
mental community that, in the pursuit of its trade agenda, the administration may
fail to make environmental protection a sufficiently high priority.
III. United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development
Against the backdrop of escalating tensions on trade and environmental issues
in the NAFTA and the GATT, the United States participated in a long-scheduled
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or Earth
Summit) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. A front-page newspaper photograph
during the conference depicted Administrator William K. Reilly of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency standing before a large homemade sign de-
picting the words "NAFTA" and "GATT" with a superimposed international
25
nix" sign.
The Earth Summit broadly addressed many environmental issues, on many of
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
21. See WASH. POST, June 10, 1992, at Al. If the panel report had been adopted, the U.S. would
have been obliged either to: (1) come into conformity with its GATT obligations by lifting the embargo;
(2) provide compensatory trade benefits to adversely affected GATT trading partners, including
Mexico; or (3) suffer the loss of trade concessions made by the adversely affected GATT signatories
(i.e., retaliation by them against U.S. exports).
22. WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1991, at A26.
23. Sabotage of America's Health, Food Safety and Environmental Laws, WASH. POST, Apr. 22,
1992, at A18.
24. See The International Dolphin Conservation Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425
(1992), amending the Marine Mammal Protection Act to authorize the negotiation of international
agreements to establish a global moratorium to prohibit harvesting of tuna through the use of purse
seine nets.
25. WASH. PosT, June 10, 1992, at Al.
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which the United States effectively exercised leadership. However, the isolation
of the United States on at least two high-profile issues, biodiversity and forests,
highlighted the continuing tension between trade and development objectives (jobs
for people), and the environmental agenda (protection of resources). While the
UNCED had no direct effect on either the NAFTA negotiations or the GATT
Uruguay Round, we are likely to feel its repercussions in trade negotiations for
years to come.
IV. The Outlook for 1993
Having concluded the path-breaking, historic North American Free Trade
Agreement last year, the administration is expected to seek congressional passage
of implementing trade legislation this year under fast-track procedures. While
each of the trade provisions will be scrutinized carefully, the outcome of the
congressional debate on the NAFTA implementing bill may well hinge on parallel
environmental commitments rather than the NAFTA text itself.
Basically, Congress will ask itself (and will be asked by the private sector,
in particular nongovernmental environmental organizations) two questions: Do
provisions in the NAFTA parallel agreed undertakings, or unilateral U.S. law
sufficiently ensure the protection of the environment? And have the administra-
tions of the United States and Mexico26 struck an appropriate, defensible balance
between trade and environmental objectives?
Many who oppose the NAFTA for nonenvironmental reasons are expected to
use the environmental mantle to cloak the real, less politically correct motive for
their opposition. These "protectionists in environmental clothing" 27 include those
who believe they cannot compete with imports from Mexico. Since their real
objective is to kill the NAFTA or exempt themselves from it, it will be impossible
to appease this camp on the environmental issues.
However, there are many groups and members of Congress whose leading (and
for some, only) concern with the NAFTA is its likely impact on the environment.
They will scrutinize the agreement and any parallel undertakings to assess such
impact, including: the continuing sovereignty of the United States to establish
unilateral, higher environmental standards and to exclude imports from Mexico
that fail to meet those standards; the prospects for creating a pollution haven in
Mexico under the NAFTA; the promulgation of adequate substantive environmen-
tal laws and standards to ensure protection of the environment, especially along
the border; and the commitment of sufficient revenues by the United States and
Mexico, jointly or severally, to fund enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations. If Congress rejects the NAFTA implementing bill, it would largely
26. While Canada is expected to be a party to the NAFTA as well, the environmental concerns
are focused almost exclusively on Mexico as a developing country.
27. Gary N. Edso (General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative), Remarks Before
the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. (July 27, 1992).
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be a function of these environmental concerns, rather than the prospect of adjust-
ment by some labor-intensive U.S. industries to increasing competition from
Mexico because of lower labor rates there.
V. The Trend Reflected in the Trade
and Environment Issues
Aside from immediate repercussions regarding the fate of the NAFTA (and
perhaps also the GATT Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations), the
trade-environment issues presage an overarching development in international
governance for the 1990s and beyond, In an increasingly global economy, issues
that had been considered strictly domestic nonetheless affect the international
competitiveness of workers and industry-in some cases, dramatically. There-
fore, they have spawned international efforts to develop agreed supranational
rules.
As a sovereign nation the United States continues to enjoy the right to determine
its environmental standards unilaterally. However, when the United States unilat-
erally establishes more stringent environmental standards than those applied by
its trading partners and requires industry to bear the cost (for example, the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments 28), its environmental objectives collide with its trade
promotion objectives. As environmental compliance costs increase, the competi-
tiveness of key U.S. industries (such as petrochemical, glass, and steel producers
and workers) is reduced against competitors in countries with lower standards (or
comparable standards that are not as effectively enforced).
Of course, Americans understandably want to eat their cake and have it too.
The United States wants to establish and enforce adequate environmental stan-
dards, but in doing so it does not wish to undermine the competitiveness of
American industry or agriculture. The United States' unilaterally enhanced pro-
tection of the environment undermines American competitiveness and, therefore,
provokes legislative proposals designed to offset the competitive advantage con-
ferred on U.S. trading partners.29
To promote trade and protect the environment, America needs to export its
environmental standards as well as its products and services. The only way to do
so is, of course, to negotiate adequate substantive standards and commitments to
enforce the standards effectively. Developing countries are more likely to be
prepared to assume such commitments (thus eliminating the competitive advan-
tage of lower environmental compliance costs) only if such assumption is linked
to their own economic development. In an era of continuing U.S. federal budget
deficits, the best way to foster an LDC's development is by facilitating its access
to developed country markets. Thus, for example, the NAFTA offers a balanced
28. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
29. See S. 59, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also S. 201, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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way to achieve both the United States's objectives: its primary purpose is to
promote trade and economic growth, but the revenues derived from such growth
will then enable each country to enforce its substantive environmental standards
more effectively.
The larger trend in international governance, then, is to negotiate international
rules and standards. This is generally preferable to unilateral national action that,
in a global economy, usually shoots the actor in the foot by undermining its
competitiveness. Further, proliferating unilateral national action raises tensions
that then must be managed. When the United States, for example, unilaterally
enacts and enforces environmental standards higher than those of some of its
trading partners, it undermines U.S. competitiveness. The reduced competitive-
ness fuels national legislative proposals to unilaterally close off or reduce access
to the U.S. market for products whose foreign producers gain a competitive
advantage through lower environmental compliance costs. Any such closing of
the U.S. market, however, may further reduce American competitiveness. It may
also violate the GATT rules largely written by the United States (with Great
Britain) after World War II. This would undermine U.S. leadership on global
trade and on economic and environmental issues.
The long-term answer to this dilemma is to negotiate adequate and effective
international standards for subjects previously considered to be domestic issues.
The short-term challenges are to: (1) manage trade tensions effectively until
such negotiations can begin to succeed; and (2) facilitate and expedite acceptable
outcomes in these negotiations.
While many believe the best way to meet both challenges is to resort to more
unilateral trade action, this is a "catch-22" that contributes to the spiral of'"unilat-
eralism" that further heightens tensions, reduces our own competitiveness, and
so forth.3 °
Despite these grave complications, the trend is clear: In an increasingly global
economy, more and more domestic decisions of federal, state, and local govern-
ments dramatically affect the international competitiveness of American industry
and agriculture. Therefore, effective international governance through the negoti-
ation and enforcement of acceptable standards is necessary to reconcile environ-
mental and international trade objectives as much as possible. Unilateral national
action contrary to international rules can be justified occasionally as civil disobedi-
ence necessary to expedite desirable change. However, it cannot provide a con-
structive long-term solution, and often proves harmful even in the short term.
30. See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
VOL. 27, NO. 1
